ORIGIN OF HISTORY AS METAPHYSIC

BY

MARJORIE L. BURKE

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For A. and M. K.

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INTRODUCTORY

The Muse Clio, carted from Pieria to the museums, can no longer be invoked without a libation to her warders, the numerous scribes, who have been busy since her fall correlating her steps, or her metamorphoses, as some say, for she has proved a difficult subject for classification:

> She is becoming bigger or better, nay she is growing many; she stations one foot in the beginning, but where is the other? Alas, it is in Asia, and the head is a fake in need of restoration!

Thus she has become Clio Tymbuchos in the professional hands of the scribes who find lively occupation exhuming and questioning her relics corked into formaldehyde and coffined into airtight compartments called historical facts.

Men have speculated her into a new myth, a sepulchre of forms, and they have named the sepulchre History. But observe her resurrections! She has arisen, a mighty thing-in-herself with her own laws and growths and decays, and disembodied, dismembered, this apparition, this butterfly-concept called Clio, is expanding towards infinity.

But speak to us again, Muse, and confute the atheistic antimousi who have at hand your relics only, which are

arranged in a perilous labyrinth of shelves and nooks and pathless paths fashioned on the principle of Penelope's web which was unwound every night with the result that there was nothing left but the winding spindle and threads. Hand us the thread which leads through the History-tomb, doctrine par-excellence of transubstantiation and resurrection of the dead.

For, once Clio mythologized about man, but was silent concerning the scraping left on a rock by an aboriginal snail or the scrapings left on rocks by aboriginal scribes, for man is never snail or rock or inscription, unless scribbling carries the Medusa's curse and transforms scribes to relics or rocks; but she sang to delight, in measured speech, and if her words sound harsher to the ear now, it is because she must shout in protest to be heard. She lies uneasy in her new temple, though it is much larger than her ancient one. She has not become accustomed to her patchwork shroud. Her celebrants have introduced strange new rites in her honor, they glorify man as an assemblage of Historical fragments, as an ear resulting from noise or a brain resulting from nerves, or as a cipher relative to something which is not stable bringing up a rear of developments from which man is salvaged but which is not-man, and carrying a future which may be not-man but which man may evolve without his ever having known what man is, though his development from something is known along with the knowledge that nothing of man is eternal but the tempo of his evolving from something into man and out of man.

The motion is called Time, and its tempo called History—Clio resurrected perforce, then made original with Time. For as the succession of phenomena are conventionally understood as a sequence of mechanical cause and effect, History, become conterminous with time, is believed to comprise in itself cause and ultimate effect and has thus become a physical concept of absolute purposefulness. But time, the con-

cept of a succession of ambiguous intervals on a continuum, is, as such, a mere abstract term of unity and it possesses no corresponding object. To supply this empirical deficiency, History, as the concept of absolute purposefulness, has been resurrected as a new metaphysic of vicarious human experience wherein man, as microcosm, comprehends all History, and History, as macrocosm, comprehends all man.

For a spiritual change has taken place which has changed the primal concern of science from the problem of form to the problem of motion, and has made it possible for History, as inquiry into the relation of human activity in general to the field of time-motion, to assume a special value and become a characteristic metaphysic.

It is clear that at some period history-writing became an occult art, and was withdrawn into an inner sanctuary, whereas in the time of Thucidides it was read to the celebrants of the Olympian games, and perversely, the change was effected at the time when History began to assume as its province mankind, the general concept of man. Employing the sign of continuity in time, it fixed the Logos as the typographical word, written to be rewritten as an elaborate hieroglyphic marking a transition in the direction of a removed and esoteric sphere of apprehension, beyond phenomena conceived as a medial object fringe obscuring the passage of time. The new fetish was the Logos-sign subsisting on the living word, and its problem of expression was to be not articulation, but signification. The discovery had been made that a sign of a sign of a sign is as indeterminate as I know that I know that I know and merely presupposes a minimum of unity which is presupposed only so that a sign may be referred to another and yet another potential sign. The meaning of the typographical word is that it is really a series of other signs and it is the seriality which is meant to be apprehended, as if apprehending successively were an

abstract apprehension of succession. In its ultimate expression it is pure continuity; its aim, the creation of an object equivalent to pure time, the field of freedom for its universal subject, mankind. The process of release from limits, whether applied generally to mankind, as a quasi-science of phantasmagoria, or conceived as a mystic confessional which, while it admits few into its secrets, imposes a universal obligation, is the central problem of History.

That a revolution of such imputedly great importance has not been explicitly recognized by theorists of history may occasion some surprise until one reflects that the intellectual disposition resulting from this revolution, and its received preconceptions, have acquired, through the habits of centuries, the force of natural, self-evident truths, and even more, they have come to constitute, by long inculcation, an instinctive pattern of thought.

This revolution became manifest, in its broadest lines, as a political movement within the later Roman empire. Its political organization, appropriately called the City of God, was first constituted in opposition to Rome, then became an extensible bureaucracy assimilable to the altered organization of the empire. Upon the death of its last great opponent, the Emperor Julian, its victory became assured.

The new City of God was a city without place or boundaries, its citizenry was limited by humanity only, since its accommodations extended to another world. It was a resurrection of the world into a transcendental City which possessed a direct line of continuity between any point and all eternity.

The Roman empire, as finally consolidated by Constantine and Diocletian, was, like the new City, an instrument capable of an endless absorption of peoples by an extension of the artificial aristocracy which was the beneficiary of centralized authority, whose head was nowhere, since it was not a personal power, yet everywhere, since it was everywhere in the

organization. The strength lay in the imputed position of power, the persons filling positions of authority could be interchanged interminably without diminishing the omnipotency of the positions. The empire, in other words, became amalgamated into a monolithic unity dependent upon the emperor, while for purposes of administration it was crumbled into innumerable provinces subjected to a hierarchy of officials stemming from the emperor's favor. The civil was separated from the military administration and each branch admitted of countless subdivisions, so that no unity of government or of the army could be possessed of actual power, and each station of authority was a dispensation of the monarch who could revoke it at any time. There existed a fiction of apparent strength ornamented with insignias of participation in a beneficent system, in a concept of universal power. The empire was constituted, as if by a mysterious felicity, to receive and to be absorbed by the invading City of God, for the homology of structure of the church and state organizations indicated identical function.

Mankind thus acquired extra-personal power in a system which was ostensibly effective for all humanity, a system in which any member can vicariously exert absolute power, since any member of a class possesses equality with the class. The goal imposed on the human-class was perfectibility by progress from the world through the medium of the City.

The intense dispute between the orthodox Athanasians and the Arians was a battle for the government of this monolithic City whose heroes were no longer the martyrs who looked forward to the imminent destruction of the world, but new politicians, leaders of doctrine. The arbitrary decision of the Council of Nicaea to incorporate the three-in-one on a basis of absolute equality was a political expedient. The City was to be henceforth One from the beginning and identical with time. The admission of a subordinate Logos would have

been insurrectionary since it would have involved the admission of a second possible city.

The fixing of the City code was the first duty of the believing community, if it was to be established for all time. If the one Deity and community were not revealed at once, for all eternity, there would be no permanent basis for the City. Conversely, for the perpetuity of the City there must be only one Deity and one code of truth.

The code of truth, conceived as having been demonstrated once and for all time to the consensus of believers, must be regarded as fixed, and communicable to the members of the believing community only, as a patent of their power, and the transmission of the Logos-sign becomes sacred duty. Truth, the City, and God, determined mankind as a conceptual unity.

In the first centuries of the Christian era there were variant apocryphal truths, and Cities at variance. The political battle for the fixing of the code was fought out at the Council of Nicaea, where the Homoousians conquered, and assimilated the emperor Constantine to the leadership of the Church organization. In the reign of Constantius, the Arians, anticipating the division of the Christian Roman Empire, gained ascendancy and proclaimed the possibility of a second Logos and a second City of God. To prevent a division, the Homoousians fought for the three-in-one concept and fanatically defended it as the very substance of the City. The one Deity, the one City of the Deity, the one humanity of the City, were made the ultimate determinations of substance, and it was decreed that the concept One, the general sign of unity, was completely determined by itself as three identical modes. The victory of the Homoousians established the domination of the man-*class*, and the standard of truth as a symbol which is handed down. The new moral it taught was the efficacy of each man, insofar as he was a member of the class. It taught that the class contained more than its mem-

bers, but that each member, insofar as he was purely class-conscious, possessed the infinite power of the class, and that this achievement of infinite power, at the cost of worldly power, was to be a progress from the world, the radically evil, towards the infinitely self-perfecting class, and that this motivation, this action for the sake of the entire class, was the radically good, and was the peculiar grace bestowed by the City.

Inquiry into this progress came to be directed to the act whereby the individual is motivated by the class and is thereby becoming freed from particular existence, particular place, condition, Self, and to his relationship to the entire class at any given time. Inquiry into this process becomes a confession of Self, the condition of election to the community of the free. The inquiry, becoming a ritual of Self-renunciation, is in the highest degree "disinterested historical method" for its assumed task is the endless absorption of the particular by the general, its final thesis is its own perfectibility as methodology, in accordance with its transcendent object beyond the world, the thing in itself, the object-behind-the-object, the pure motivation of the man-*class.*

Thus was conceived the noumenal sphere where mankind exists free from Self and the world, and of which, since it is beyond any image, no image may be formed, but which may be only approximated by a series of acts, insofar as man acts for the class. The notion of the noumenal sphere gave man a new perspective of power and a new horizon of knowledge, and obliged him to act and think in conceptual terms. For as the mass-man was obliged to act for the sake of the class, so it became his duty to think by means of communicable signs, or concepts, established in reference to fixed truths, to which the signs could approximate by means of the abstraction of particulars, while remaining conventions, rather than demonstrations of truth.

The procedure of pure critique is a construction of its

object by means of demonstration by principles, a procedure differing from historical method, which, while it may employ criticism of its materials, establishes its object in relation to one pre-established, so that its position is always provisional and relative to another.

The method of class-consciousness, which is here designated Historical, appropriates the particular to the universal, thus simplifying and classifying single cognitions for the purpose of easy communication, by means of a conventional mark or sign, and thereby also enlarging the class in the direction of the totality of its series of members which it requires.

A demonstration, being a singular act, cannot be communicated by a sign without having become simpler than it is, for a sign can refer only to the result of the act, that is, its phenomenon. The representation of phenomena, the finished acts, is the concept, the general term, which, because of the class-demand that all objects of knowledge be communicable, is so frequently held to be the function of knowledge and the principle of recognition.

This method assumes the infinite as its object of inquiry, for it is based on the metaphysical belief in the motivating thing-in-itself, the existence of a pure causal force as the substratum of phenomena and the object of reason, an object moving reason as a principle, but which, because it is unlimited, is hidden and cannot be demonstrated in its totality, but only progressively; and upon this notion of the possibility of progressive action through the principle is based the notion of perfectibility of method of inquiry.

An inquiry into origins which consists in formal demonstration is the method of critique, and the reverse of the historical procedure, which inquires into origins in regard to their temporal sequence, relating phenomena as concepts to a metaphysical adiabatic continuum through which they are conceived to subsist. The method of history, being a technique

of inquiry which assumes its own inherent perfectibility as its condition, has no principle by which to critically estimate its aim, but beneath its procedure of "scientific disinterest," and "observation at a distance," is a dogmatic, anti-rational belief in the infinite.

I

THE IMAGE AND THE THING-IN-ITSELF

The function of cognition is conventionally divided into the pyramidal schema of sense, understanding, and reason, as being the production of perceptions, concepts, and ideas, respectively. Sense perception is used as the basis of the pyramid, since it is believed that without this faculty, cognition of any object would be impossible, and it is viewed as the lowest section of the cognizing scale, as it is believed to be a faculty which contributes nothing to the cognition of an object as it is in itself.

But sense, as a capacity for varying degrees of intensity of feeling, while it accompanies cognition, is not a faculty of perception. For a perception is an action, and sense is the capacity of being acted upon.

The perception of an object is an anticipation of its construction. It is not a construction of an extension, but a reconstruction, by an image, of a given extension. There is no image which is not of an extension and its limitation. The image given in a perception is singular and finite. Though it contains many parts, it is perceived as a whole. The principle of unity by which it is given as a whole cannot be a function of sense, which gives only degrees of sensation. The image acts upon sensation with varying degrees of intensity, but intensity of sensation is productive merely of

feeling. All images are topological, and there is no image which is without position and dimension.

The production of the image is made possible by the construction of the object itself. It is impossible that perception is a pure construction, if it does not give the principles of its construction. But no image provides a cognition of the principles of its production. It is the image of a result, and is perceived as phenomenon. Contemplation of the image will yield no more than is given, and the principles by which it is created must be ascribed to a faculty other than perception.

It is impossible that it is necessary for an object of perception to be constructed according to principles, and for the perception to possess only subjective validity, unless some principle is demonstrated whereby it is proved necessary to construct only phenomenal objects of knowledge, since what is given to cognition, and what cognition desires, is not the image, but the thing-in-itself, which, because of its transcendent, infinite existence, can never be wholly represented by an image.

From such a principle a demonstration of the infinite would be required, but this demonstration is impossible, since it would have to be successive, or empirical, an aggregate of finite steps whose total would never constitute an object, for the principle of unity in an object is found in its finite construction. Hence, the principle of unity in the object-in-itself cannot be demonstrated, and can only be signified by a succession of finite steps. Therefrom it is deduced that all constructions have only a phenomenal, or aesthetic, value, and that the object-in-itself, while given to cognition, can never be cognized, or that if it can be cognized, it is through an extra-sensuous faculty, or that objects possess only intensive existence. For if all constructions are of sensuous material, all finite objects are phenomena.

If construction of the topological object is the production of phenomenon, then the pure construction of its form in the

science of geometry demonstrates that cognition is limited, a priori, to the construction of illusion. Thus cognition is obliged to be deceived, and knowledge of its object, its truth, is impossible. For its truth would be the cognition of an infinite hither-world, of which all constructions are phenomenal symbols, momenta on a continuous field.

The proposition that only phenomena are objects of cognition is deduced from the belief that the finite is an illusion of the infinite, and that only the possibility of infinity permits finite construction, since any finite quantum can be contained in one larger than itself, and contain one smaller. Hence all demonstrations could demonstrate no more than that they are a priori limited, that the finite world is not a true object, that it is necessary to construct the pure form of phenomena in order to know that it is illusory.

But the image given in a perception does not present the principle of its construction. It may be capricious in form and transcend the possibility of existence. The correspondence of the image with its object, which is its truth, can be ascertained only by an additional act, the construction of the object itself. This construction is possible, not because the object may be contained, or contain parts, for its container and the things contained would themselves be finite units, and hence separate singular constructions, but by the same principle of unity whereby the image is perceived as a whole, the object is bounded on every side, in every dimension, into a body.

Every demonstration is a giving of limits by the application of surfaces, and therefore it is external, for no description of the object as a whole is possible from within, for each position within is limited as a part by finite position. A demonstration is the imposition of a form which includes the parts while it is not a mere totality, but a superfice enclosing superficial parts. Since every construction is a filling of a finite unit, it is a singular and complete act wherein each object

contains its place and excludes every other object therefrom, and since its existence is completely given in its construction as a whole, it has no existence apart from this act and therefore does not change. For if it changed, it would need to occupy another place, but this is impossible, except in-itself, in respect to its parts, each of which occupies a place different from the other.

The principle of unity in an object excludes the possibility of simplicity in the object. A simple object would have no parts, since it would be unextended, and since therefore it would have no limits, its existence would necessarily be "in-itself." It must be self-limiting, that is, unlimited, since there must be nothing outside to limit it. It must be self-limiting without a principal of limits.

Since an object is a construction of unity and completely determined by that act, its whole existence is given in its finite description and it is without beginning or end. For since it is identical with the unity of the act, it cannot occupy less than its entire given position. It cannot be less than its finity except in itself, but it cannot be less than finite since its parts are finite. It cannot be more than finite, for each addition is finite, but it is a perfect interval whose cause, in reference to its construction, is the image, and in reference to its image, the construction.

If the object were not given as a whole it would be impossible that there should be different objects. Only if an object has position can it have position different from another object. If it had no position, if it were in itself, it would be uniform and continuous. If it were not given as a whole it would have no identity with itself and could not be perceived as an image.

The unity impressed on the object is expressed by the knower as his own principle of action, and it is the same principle by which he is determined as an object and given his finite place. Because he is finite he can perceive his own

image, which is given to cognition, and from this image, which gives the possibility of self-perfection, self-consciousness occurs. If the consciousness of self was merely the relating of different perceptions to a non-objective, non-finite, unity, a unity in-itself which cannot be perceived, it would be a unity imposed only, and not constructive. By this principle no image could be perceived, or constructed, but experienced as an intensity only, and the unity of consciousness would consist in an empirical deduction of merely phenomenal unity. For all the limitations of an object limit it as a unity, and without these limits, consciousness of self or any other object is impossible.

If the unity was transcendent and was itself not an object of perception, but in the object, then all creating, from within, all externalizing of the principle of unity, must be regarded as the construction of a phenomenal prison on all sides, and in every direction, from the thing-in-itself.

For between the perceiver and his object exists a distance which he cannot comprehend without the construction of the entire object, which construction requires a position outside the object. From inside, from the thing-in-itself, any approach to a limit could be approximated only by a series of finite steps, each of which completely limits the parts it contains, and each of which is completely limited by the whole, "out of itself." Hence, from the thing-in-itself, all limits are infinitely distant because they cannot be attained by a series of finite steps, and therefore it-itself is infinite, the limits phenomenal, partial constructions of a substance which in itself has no parts, and necessarily constructed infinitely far from the transcendent object, which, in its continuous progress, ever sets the limits at a greater distance, and which, if it were given in its entirety, would form that paradox called the infinite whole.

Accordingly, if the ego exists in itself, it must have an existence different from the self whose image is given in

perception, which must be infinitely far from the substantial ego, which is confined by the phenomenal construction of the body so that it may be instructed in its own illimitude, and self-consciousness must advance in the manner of an infinitesimal calculus whereby the self, the bodily image, proportionately recedes. But each advance of self-consciousness towards the limits of self, that is, in the direction of selflessness, is finite and made possible by the image, which, since it is a representation of a position, must be conceived, in relation to the ego-in-itself, as a part and not as a whole, a finite segment constructed in a continuous progress, and which, while it makes self-consciousness possible, derives its unity from the substantial ego of which it is an alteration, according to an internal principle of unity, in and through succession, of an infinite whole.

In itself, the ego is constructed, and this imposed form is experienced as an internal succession of the construction of separate parts, for in itself, the unity is hidden, and the self which is created as a whole can be experienced as parts only. Internalizing of perception puts the self-image at a greater and greater distance, in anticipation of the total completion of the parts of the series of the infinite whole. But the conception of this process would be impossible except in relation to the image which gives unity to perception and is the anticipation of the creating of a whole object. Without it the parts of succession could not be internally related to a single ego.

Because the unity of the image includes its parts it is possible to perceive phenomena as existing simultaneously in relation to the experience of succession whereby an interval is perceived to have elapsed by the construction of a finity. Without this filling of finity, on the other hand, it would be impossible to assume an external world which is given in extension, for it must have been constructed, and thereby have been made "past." Since perception of an image gives the possibility of its construction, what is perceived as past,

in respect to the ego, is the possibility of its construction. The experience of succession belongs to the ego as it is acted upon, but this experience is given by the finished whole, the self, whose image, as a final cause, makes possible the experience of succession; but which cannot be known by the ego in its experience of succession whereby it is determined in its various parts. For what passes in its experience are its own limits, and with those limits, the possibility of an action whereby the ego can creatively determine, and thereby know, its self. The experience of succession belongs to the ego-in-itself whose limits are given it; if the ego were purely constructive it would never perceive parts successively. But the ego-in-itself perceives its determinations as parts only, and it is the absolute unchangeableness of the parts which makes the experience of succession possible, for if one part were not completed, another could not follow.

Since the experience of succession is given the ego in its medial relation to its object through an image of the world of simultaneous existence in a past, finite, interval, the totality of the intervals would constitute the infinite whole which is the object in itself, and whose possibility is given in the experience of succession. Unity in the object makes possible the perception of parts as necessarily connected in a succession, but a perception is always of phenomena. Hence the unity imposed on the object would be experienced, in itself, as a faculty of necessarily connecting phenomena given in succession. Since a perception is of an object past, of its phenomenon, its image must be regarded as infinitely far from the perceiver, for between the ego-in-itself and the image is a line of perception whose parts are given successively. In the internalization of perception, the only unity between the parts of an object is to be ascribed to their necessary connection in succession, and phenomena, internalized as parts of a unity given only successively, would be contingent upon a unity derived from the thing-in-itself, and

their finity is only apparent, their limits varying with their distance from the perceiver.

If phenomena are given successively, they must be conceived, in relation to one another, as possessing a beginning and an end. But since the object-in-itself is infinite, its parts must be considered to possess a direction only from beginning and towards completion. By the increasing of the number of conditions whereby the totality of phenomena are to be represented as a whole, the limits of phenomena are made more distant, and thereby the limits of the ego become more remote.

Internally, phenomena are connected necessarily as a line of mediation between the ego and the object-in-itself. Only by means of their connection could the ego attain to the direction of the limits of phenomena, yet only through them is it necessarily chained by position, and to the knowledge of appearance. For when it is internalized, the image is not the presentation of an object to be constructed, but is made the condition for the perception, or internal construction, of the succession of phenomena, whereby they are connected as prior and posterior intervals, the latter denoting a direction along the mediating line toward the region of completion of the series. Because the prior becomes perfectible by the posterior, as the members in a series are increased towards the totality of the infinite whole, the future becomes a conception of the past perfected, and the past must be considered as completely given with the future as the condition of its perfectibility. But the basis for this unity is the act of perception by which the image of the self is given as past, in relation to the ego, and the extension of this perception is made to include all future constructions in the concept of what has passed. An inquiry into this process whereby phenomena, by virtue of their internal connection with other phenomena, can change, that is, can exceed their own limits in a movement towards the limitless, would itself be per-

fectible, for by increasing the representations of phenomena in a series, and enlarging the horizon of the past, the totality of conditions representing the future is thereby augmented, and the inquiry serves as mediator between the ego and the object-in-itself.

But the internal representations by which phenomena are connected in the direction of perfection in the infinite whole is a deduction made on the analogy of the construction, as form, of the image given in a perception.

The creative possibility, by which the self can be known, is let pass, when the interval of its creation is judged as an infinitated part of a limitless whole, and a simultaneous change will seem to occur, in relationship to the ego, of all the limits of the interval, which must be connected internally by given limits of the self, and the self thereby is put at a distance from the ego and impersonalized. The unity of what is extended and given by perception then appears, by virtue of internal identity which is produced by this unity of the self, a substantial principle which makes possible succession over a plane of internalized images whereby the ego can become conscious as identical substance changing through a series.

If the ego judges the self as merely a limit temporarily constructed in order to bring the ego to complete contiguity with the object-in-itself, then the ego is merely limited and not constructive. If its judgment in respect to the image of self is a negative act, if the self is considered as only a condition of mediating, as internalized perception, between the pure ego and the pure object, then the ego is not self-creating but must be self-communicating, it must be totally comprehended by the thing-in-itself.

To become fully communicated the ego would require a complete mediation, a totality of limits, and therefore it must possess community with the totality of phenomena so that it may exist where it does not have position, so that it may

exceed its own phenomenal limits given by the self, and yet maintain its identity in succession. The basis for such a community must be an internal unity upon which phenomena subsist and through which they succeed one another. The principle of such a community must be deduced as its substantial identity with the object-in-itself, for while the ego is communicated as a series whose parts must possess substantial equality, yet it must be communicated as a whole to retain its identity, and thus its perfectibility is its equality, as a universal subject, with a universal object.

Thus, on the analogy of the unity of a whole interval of a construction, the ego obtains a negative unity through its equality with a community of substance, wherein are subtracted the finite differences of phenomena. By an initial negative judgment on the self, the ego is infinitated. But the ego is, by this negative judgment, made completely determined in respect to its phenomenal existence, the existence by which it becomes conscious, and is unfree of its limits except as it exists in equality with other members of a phenomenal series connected internally.

For the self is a finite construction, and an affirmative judgment concerning it is an act whereby it receives determinations, for the affirmative judgment is nothing else than its construction. By an affirmative judgment the ego determines the self as a unity, declares it, whose image determines the existence of the ego itself, as worthy of construction. The judgment, whereby the object is known, is an evaluation of its construction as a moral act. The judgment, in respect to the act, is apodictical; the act, in respect to the judgment, is necessary. It is a singular proposition demonstrating the worth of the self.

The affirmative judgment on the self is a recognition of its allotted place, of the necessity of its being perfected as a finite object, and this judgment, as an action, makes the self good by means of its image.

But since the demonstrative judgment is good only for the self, as belonging to it only, as the act whereby the self is affirmed, it is not to be communicated by any other representation. Since it is singular, unique, a construction of place, it does not possess equality with any other representation; since it is completely fulfilled by its limits, it does not occupy any other place. Therefore it is not continuous with other objects. It does not change. It does not belong to a community of objects subsisting on equality.

The ego, in constructing its object, is like a solitary beast of prey, whose prey, however, must be created, for the act of possession. Therefore, while the ego creates in order to know, it is not in order to share its object by communication, to thereby make itself known. An object is good only if it is a possession of the self alone, if it is its construction, its own exercise of power. It sets self-perfection in its own finity as the goal of the ego, and thereby posits an act whereby the ego is to be completely externalized as the self, through the construction of its image.

The act whereby the self is affirmed as the object of the ego is a demonstrative judgment which makes other demonstrations, and therefore knowledge, possible. For if the ego is creative, it is so in order to create for itself. Because the moral act determining the self is necessary for the perfection of the ego, the self is its object of greatest interest. If it has a value, so has whatever it contains, and by virtue of its own value it can create others, and all objects of perception are possible judgments.

In a negative judgment the self is denied as an object, and judged to have been created for the sake of another object, and it possesses only a negative value in its capacity of being shared, removed from its place into a communicative series of phenomena by virtue of its equality with the community of substance. As a mediator, the self makes known to the object constructed in itself, the subject in itself, in

order that the ego will be entirely free, be entirely subject to the object through its being comprehended, by its internal identity with the totality of phenomena, by the totality of infinite limits. The self, as mediator between the ego and its infinite object, is a historical phenomenon which, by its internalization, brings the past into necessary connection with the future as a single movement, and thus, for the ego-in-itself, there exists for its knowledge only the past as internally connected perceptions, and the future, a conception of the past as a finished infinite whole. The ego-in-itself thus never exists in the present, being subject to the movement, and is never immediately connected with its object, except by its assumed possibility of becoming, in its entirety, a prey to the thing-in-itself.

II

THE COMMUNICATION OF THE IMAGE

When a negative judgment is passed on the images of the self and the object of the ego is judged to be other than the self, the ego, so far as it is constructive and acts from the principle of the self, will determine only phenomena. The self, by a negative judgment, is infinitated. When the self is held to be not a true representation of the ego, then all finite constructions of the ego must be held to be merely aesthetic. If the self is merely a phenomenon of the ego it must be constructed from within, and the principle of its production infinite, or construction by parts, of an infinite whole, and each construction of a part, from within, makes another part more distant. Each part of the ego then would derive value from its position within the infinite whole, insofar as it permits its construction.

The image therefore possesses a negative value, in respect to its change, whereby the ego is permitted to expand, and retain its identity. If the ego exists in itself, it must construct the self as the condition of its existence, as its principle of identity in a cognition, and yet must be able to change this self; because it is a condition and limitative, it must be able to put it at a distance. For in itself, the ego is limited on all sides, and its existence is completely determined.

The ego is never able to enounce any judgment demon-

strably concerning its existence in itself, for its assumption of this existence negates the principle of demonstrative judgments as the function of the self, and as being contingent on an internal existence. The ego could never cognize its existence in itself, therefore, except by an act wherein the self is entirely infinitated, that is, wherein the self is completely delimited and the ego frees itself from its own created necessity, through its identity in a series of negative units which are in the direction of a positive unit which will comprehend the entire series as the totality of its conditions. For if the ego is not fully constructed by the self, its existence is elsewhere, a region to which the self has no immediate relation, but to which the self, insofar as it is finite, is obstructive; though for which the self, if it can become displaced, and thereby changed, has a negative value. The complete negation of self would permit the ego to make an apodictical judgment on its existence, in itself, for the complete negation would be the construction of the infinite whole, infinite, because it is internal, and a whole, because the unit is the only term whereby the ego may cognize any object whatsoever.

The self is infinitated by its internalization wherein its image is not constructed as an object but judged in respect to its existence, that is, its negation, its distance from the ego, its change and duration; for cognition, to the ego-in-itself, is an act upon it, wherein it receives existence in proportion to the completeness of the conditions given it. In itself, the ego can but approach the completeness of its conditions by infinitating every limit, by finding a limit which will contain every given limit.

The self is internalized by the reconstruction of its image in a perception and when it is judged that the self exists as this representation only, that its finity is but the appearance of an internal principle whereby the parts, in their totality, constitute a whole, that it is necessary as a phenomenon because of this principle from which it derives existence as a com-

municator of the ego constructing the totality of its conditions in an effort at cognition.

An object changes when it occupies more than one place, or when its place is infinitated. In itself, the place is not a unit but a part and therefore its finity is merely contingent upon the totality constituting the whole. The principle of the construction of an infinite whole is its internal unity, and each construction as the mere function of the principle, must possess general identity with the whole, and be in itself an undetermined and ambiguous interval.

When an image is considered as the partial construction of a whole it is thereby removed from the ego as its complete finite determination and put into a region which is, in itself, infinite. When the image is negated it is considered as but a part of an infinite whole in which the ego constructs an object. By a negative judgment on the image the ego wills to construct an object, not external and finite, but internally, an undetermined region whose parts, through participation in it, partake of complete equality with one another, and therefore, when constructed in their totality, would possess equality with the whole region.

The ego can construct this region by virtue of its identity with the self whose image is given, as a possible construction, in perception. When this possibility of construction is not fulfilled, it constitutes an empty interval in respect to the ego, and the ego is thereby determined as merely identical with itself. But it is obliged to consider these intervals in respect to a unit, for by the principle of its own self-identity, without which it could not be conscious of any object, it can cognize parts only as parts of something. This interval consists in the putting away of the self-image, the ego's judgment negating its own constructed limits, and making them contingent upon a placeless region conceived as containing the totality of undetermined intervals, where the image exists, in itself, without having been constructed as a sub-

jective determination. Thus the problem of the ego-in-itself is not the problem of formal construction, but of pure being, of existence without limitation.

This region into which the image is displaced, or made infinite, must be constructed on the analogy of the finite object, that is, it must be conceived as a whole, in itself, through which the image may be infinitated and retain existence by its identity in an infinite series, or its identity in time, the experience of the ego in internalizing, or infinitating, the interval given for construction of an object. This infinitation of the image by which it is communicated to an infinite field is its concept, or its analogical construction as a series. By means of the concept the image can be represented in general, as an undetermined interval. In the construction of an internal whole, the concept accompanies each construction of the parts as the principle of internal unity through which they constitute a whole.

The infinite field for finite objects in general is space. Space is the concept which must accompany any phenomenon in its finite displacement, if the phenomenon is to retain its identity. For if it retains its identity there must be equality between one place and the other. If the image is completely displaced it is completely equalized, completely communicated by its concept. Therefore if a phenomenon were to be constructed as pure being, in itself, it must occupy every part of space, to be fully constructed free.

If the principle of unity in the field is internal, then it subsists through the equality of the parts, and all the parts must have equality with the whole if they are to be completely communicated. Thus space is the concept of an infinite field of place constructed of infinitated parts, or phenomena, apparently finite, but infinite by their participation in the field, for any part of infinity is infinite. Each part in the field (in itself) can be contained, and contain another part, and remain identical with itself. But this identity can-

not be by virtue of its being a part, since as a part it exists in reference to another part; but as a part constructed analogically from a concept, it is abstracted from its position as a part and given complete participation in the field and obtains identity through its concept.

All parts of the region, or field, for internal analogical construction, are identical, and therefore continuous, as being the abstraction of the intervals in which finite objects are constructed. If the ego wills not to construct an image as a finite place, it thereby abstracts it from its possible place. This act of abstraction puts the image at a distance from the ego, consisting in the interval of its possible construction. The interval, as given to the ego, is experienced as merely the function of internal identity in the construction of a unit. The interval, therefore, as undetermined by the ego, is continuous, in being unlimited and by being given as the possibility of a whole construction. Time is therefore the concept of a completely undetermined, continuous interval, the abstraction of the act whereby the ego creates an object.

An object is constructed as a finite interval giving place to its image. When the ego, by a negative judgment on the image, does not construct it as an interval, it is placed an undetermined distance from the image by the act of perception by which it is merely limited by phenomena, which are, in themselves, parts of a continuous interval on a line of perception between the ego and its object. In order to create the entire field from within, the ego must put every image at a distance. But since the object of every image is a finite interval, the totality of images cannot be put at a distance, and thereby made past, by an interval, but only by parts of the interval. But if the parts are finite, the whole interval cannot be created from the addition of the parts. In itself, however, the interval can be composed by the addition of parts as the undetermined distances between the ego and its images, as mediating an infinite distance between the ego and its object.

Time, as the abstraction of a creative act, removes the act from its object, and permits the conception of action at a distance. By virtue of this concept, the ego acts in order to remove itself from its image, and is thereby placed in an impersonal, medial relation to its object. The totality of the act would require that the ego was placed distant from the totality of phenomena, whereby the entire distance between it and the object would be mediated. But the describing of distance between the ego and a phenomenon requires the perception of the phenomenon as a limit of mediation, a limit which can be obviated by the describing of another distance, or the ego's being determined in respect to another interval, from which, since the ego does not create it as an object, the ego is infinitated. Time, then, is the experience of the ego's being constructed as parts, and the concept which accompanies every construction as an internal principle of unity. Each act which determines the ego as a self is finite, but is in itself infinite, that is, insofar as the ego can merely be determined, it can never cognize an object immediately, as a complete interval, because between it and any object is its own interval in which it is being determined as another object, and which is to the mere ego-in-itself ambiguous in respect to limits, and cognizable to the ego as the bare function of its own principle of identity which puts it at a distance from the images given in perception.

In itself, the interval in which the ego is determined must be continuous, since it permits the ego to identify itself in every construction of the interval, and constructed of the acts in which the ego is put at a distance from its images. For if the interval were constructed as a whole it would be finite, and the ego completely determined. But if the interval is constructed of parts, the ego is never completely determined by a finite limit, for an infinity of parts must have been constructed before the ego is comprehended by a limit. But as parts, they are constructed by virtue of the whole, which is

the principle of internal identity subsisting between the parts of an interval in the possibility of constructing the ego as a unit. The abstraction of the interval from the act of creation is the concept of time, wherein the ego, in-itself, may be created free, and put at an infinite distance from the totality of limitations.

But the ego can be constructed as free only by parts. For each distancing of the ego is done by virtue of a judgment on the self-image, that is, each distancing requires a prior construction of limits, so that the condition of freedom for the ego is its construction, in itself, of its limits, and its becoming subject to the analogical construction of the free interval; therefore, in the analogical construction of the ego by the concept time, each part has a beginning in the ego's phenomenal limitation, and an end in passing the ego through the one part to another, and thereby putting the ego at a distance from its phenomenal image. But if the parts convey the ego from one limit to another, the parts themselves must be unlimited, and every interval given for a construction must be, in itself, an infinite member of a whole region constructed by placing limits at a distance.

The whole which is constructed, in itself, from parts, must be identical with the parts. If it were not, there would be no principle which would determine the parts as such, for the whole, in itself, is but the totality of its parts. The principle which determines the parts as a whole must therefore be internal, and is the complete equality of the parts.

In an undetermined interval the ego is given the possibility of freedom, but freedom from what is past only. For the condition of its freedom is its being moved away from its limits as phenomenon, but the condition of its being made distant is its construction of phenomena. For its freedom through the undetermined interval it must pass from one finite limit to another. But all the parts of the interval are identical, so each part can contain another or be contained,

and contain its limits, which are given it by the concept time.

Time, as the analogical construction of the ego as undetermined, abstracts it from its determination as a self. But as time is a concept constructed by its parts, as a region in-itself, it determines the ego as a succession of parts connected by complete identity, for since time is a construction by parts, it can determine the ego only serially, as parts necessarily connected by their equality. Time gives the ego the possibility of complete internal existence in depth, distance, and motion.

In this parallogistic construction of time, the parts precede the whole, and are necessarily connected as such. Time, in determining the ego as a series, makes its own construction the condition of cognition, that is, the concept of time imposes upon the ego cognition through concepts, inasmuch as it gives the ego the possibility of freedom through the infinitation of its image by a counter-construction.

In a whole constructed by its parts, that is, a whole conceptual region, the principle of construction is the necessary connection of the parts, if by their addition, the whole is to be formed. If the parts were finite, they would not be connected necessarily, as merely parts, for as such, there would be no communication between them; if they are parts by virtue of an internal principle, they are continuous through the complete freedom of the field, and equal with the whole concept, in being the principle of its construction, that is, in each construction, the concept must be given as a whole. Therefore, as determined by the concept time, the ego cognizes an object mediately, through parts in-themselves necessarily connected and continuous.

The concept time, the free, or negative interval, necessitates the concept of space, the field of free, negative extension; for if the object is to be constructed from within, by the addition of parts, it must have a free, non-finite field for its

expansion. In a construction by parts, each addition must be continuous with the preceding part, by the principle of internal identity, and each addition must allow the preceding to change, or expand, in the direction of the whole object. Because of this continuity, every part communicates with every other, but each part is contingent upon the construction of a preceding part, as its cause. But it is only by virtue of its complete determination by a preceding part that it had community with the whole. Therefore, in a construction of time a phenomenon is determined in space as the result of an internal expansion, and as a cause, since it is, in itself, a construction of the field, of a subsequent expansion. For as it is determined by the concept, a phenomenon must be moved through the entire interval in the construction of a space-object. Thus time is the analogical construction of an object as a unity from within, by the addition of parts, and is the principle of an analogical apodictical judgment on the necessary connection of phenomena as cause and effect, a judgment which however, is hypothetical in form, since the totality of its successively constructed parts is the condition of its demonstration. The judgment is therefore synthetical. If the synthetical judgment is apodictical, the parts of the judgment must be connected necessarily. The necessary connection is supplied by the time-concept which must be created successively, and which must be given as a whole in each of its parts as the principle of their construction. Therefrom the ego derives the analogical principle by which its image may be communicated as a term in a synthetical proposition.

The analogical construction made for comprehending the ego in a cognition, as it is in itself, is the field of substance. The concept of substance is the analogical place-region of the completely infinitated ego. Through its determination by the ambiguous interval, the ego is communicated as subject to the concept, and as subject, it has existence in proportion to the degree of its communication with the principle of con-

ceptual, or negative, construction. Each degree of its communication abstracts it further from the image and expands its existence by the addition of a new part, effecting a change whereby the ego is moved away from the self-image; it is, through the concept, mediately created, but immediately communicated, as substance. In reference to its existence, therefore, its judgment is problematical, for this would require, for a demonstration, the totality of its constructions, by which the ego, as determined by the concept time, is mediated. But in reference to its communication it judges immediately, by virtue of the concept time, without whose analogical construction it would be impossible for the ego to possess a substantial existence, or be governed by the principle of a concept.

In respect to the analogical principle of its construction, the ego has a beginning of existence, in that the concept which mediates it connects it directly with substance by constructing it as a part. Since the construction of the ego conceptually requires an addition of a part to the field, this conceptual principle is causal in relation to the ego, that is, its existence is necessarily mediated by a change whereby it is connected immediately, and therefore necessarily, with the substance-field. But its construction therein is the condition for its existence. The ego is necessarily constructed, as the whole requires the totality of all its parts. Therein is the principle by which the ego judges its existence necessary, in an analogical apodictical judgment on the construction of a concept by its parts, wherein the parts are amplified, in a continuous motion, in the direction of the whole. Since the whole concept requires the totality of its parts, the ego is necessarily communicated. But its construction requires the construction of a previous part, since it is communicated by virtue of its identity with the whole which is constructed of parts, and its existence requires that it be communicated along the entire series which contains the principle of its construction

in the field, for were it not communicated along the entire series, it could not enlarge it by its addition.

The ego can judge of its existence, in itself, by virtue of the same principle by which it is determined as an internal existence, that is, by the concept time. All judgments on the ego in-itself are therefore conceptual constructions made on the analogy of the creation of the finite self. In reference to its existence, in itself, the ego can never judge immediately, but only of the necessity for its mediation in the field of existence. For the analogical apodictical principle of all judgment is that every image must be moved into a free field.

All judgment on existence is therefore problematical, for any demonstration of the substantial sphere requires the construction of all its parts, in compliance with the principle of its internal demonstration, wherein the construction of any part must enlarge the region and include all prior constructions. For the concept of substance is the analogical construction of a singular, unlimited, object, whose parts are contingent upon their construction as such. Therefore judgment of existence requires a prior construction by the principle of internal connection, and of its existence in itself, the ego can judge only mediately. But it judges immediately on the principle of its existence by an act devaluating the image of self, and it is this act, therefore, which must be regarded as causal to all conceptual construction. The construction of a concept is a mediation between the ego and a free field, and is therefore the act of communicating the image. Consequently, every judgment of the ego on its existence in-itself must be the result of another judgment, and each judgment must be accompanied by the principle of negative judgment, or the analogical construction of an object at a distance, by the complete negation of the image.

The ego can judge, then, of its internal existence, only by a mediate construction of the substantial field, for since the principle governing the concept is internal construction, the

ego is connected immediately with parts of the field only. But by virtue of the principle of the necessity for internal connection of the parts, on the analogy of the unity of the finite object, the ego judges universally that the field must contain all its parts as a principle of unity. That it is constructed, internally, from parts, establishes it as a plurality of identical parts. From the combination of the universal and particular judgments, on the analogy of the construction of the finite object, the ego is presented with the possibility of constructing, from the totality of parts, the analogical singular judgment.

In anticipation of this analogical singular judgment wherein the image is completely communicated, the ego judges its degree, or extent of existence, in-itself, by exercising the principle which determines it as an internal continuum, and by which it can cognize phenomena as necessarily connected parts. By the same principle by which it is internalized it internalizes. As, on the analogy of finite self-determination, the ego wills to be completely subject to internal determination wherein it is constructed as parts mediating the distance between it and its object, of its existence it can judge no more than that it is necessarily connected with a free field, and therefore its judgment of existence must be a negative construction of phenomenal limits.

Cognition of a complete concept would be a completed negative judgment, but since cognition by concepts is cognition by parts, the object-in-itself is never given to cognition, for it is always distant from any of its constructions, each of whom it infinitates. The object of conceptualizing, then, is the phenomenon. A phenomenon is conceptualized when it is displaced and analogically constructed at a distance in a free space-region. By virtue of this negative construction, it is ambiguously determined and placed into substantial relation, or community, with all other phenomena, for its infinitation is its communication to the free field. In respect

to the whole field, the concept, phenomena are simultaneously infinitated. In respect to their organization, they are necessarily constructed as parts, as the condition for cognition of the concept, which, in making each part subject to the whole field, gives it necessary connection with the field. But this connection must be constructed by parts, so that each part is necessarily subject to another which includes it; but the part, being determined by the concept, cannot be contained by less, so that each part must have complete communication with the concept, but it can have communication only by its being communicated by a larger part. Therefore the existence of any part is determined by its necessary connection with another. In-itself, a phenomenon has existence only as it can be subject to the whole class and predicated by a part, that is, to have existence, it must possess the possibility of being extended by the addition of parts, whereby it is changed, or given other places, by virtue of its substantial identity with all other parts of the field.

As subject to the whole class, each part must be considered as causal since it is subject to the part wherein it is changed, or predicated, which part is constructed as the communication of the first, and whose existence, therefore, is contingent upon the prior construction. Phenomena, then, exist as they are subject to change by participation in the concept. The ego, inasmuch as it is determined by the principle of the concept, is subject to the whole field, and so far as it is subject, it has the possibility of constructing, through cognition, its totality of parts, as the subjects' complete predication. Therefore the ego, insofar as it is subject, must be considered as cause of the constructions by which it is given its objects of cognition, for since the ego, in itself, could cognize only by the construction of parts, the ego itself must supply the principle of unity by which they can be cognized as such, and this principle is its substantial identity with each of its constructions. In itself, the ego could cognize

only by the same principle which determines it as an internal existence, and that is the negation of its image. The ego, as subject to the concept, must be considered as the cause of this act of cognition, for the cognition is related to the object only as the ego constructs it, that is, mediately. When the ego cognizes synthetically, by the addition of parts, it is compelled to construct a concept-region of continuous identity, of existence in-itself, to communicate, or negate, the complex, finite, image given it in a perception.

In itself, the subject must supply the principle whereby it is enlarged by the addition of parts. On the analogy of the construction of the finite object, it must contain the total of its parts, yet since it can enlarge itself only by their successive construction, it must construct more than it contains. Therefore, it must cognize synthetically, by the addition to itself of new parts, that is, it must have communication with that which it does not contain. Thus the ego, in itself, can construct predicates of itself as subject only by becoming included in larger regions. But inasmuch as it is included it is limited. But inasmuch as its inclusion is made possible only by its communication with the principle of conceptual construction, it is, in-itself, unlimited. That is, though the ego cognizes, or constructs itself as parts, the principle of the concept by which it necessarily connects the parts is greater than the parts, though contained by them, for by the principle, each part may be moved into a larger. The ego, then, by virtue of its principle of negative construction, is greater than any of the constructions whereby it cognizes, and therefore it cannot cognize itself as it exists, in-itself. For cognition by concepts is not of the whole object, but is its construction by parts, and therefore mediate, a negative action by which, in respect to the concept, the ego, as a substantial part, is necessarily connected with other parts as their effect, and which, in respect to the ego, is its mediation in a free field. Though it is limited by each cognition, each cognition pro-

vides the condition for its freedom, insofar as each cognition can extend it as a subject-cause, that is, as each cognition moves it in the direction of infinity.

The ego, in displacing, or conceptualizing its image, must construct it as a part of a larger region, and as a part, necessarily connected with another part. For were the phenomenon not causally connected with a phenomenon, it would be determined by the concept only, and would be the construction of the concept in its totality, therefore a thing-in-itself. If it were not causally connected with a phenomenon it would be immediately related to the ego in a cognition without extending the ego, and therefore could not be cognized as an objective existence, but a mere representation of the ego. If it were not a construction of a region larger than the ego, it could not communicate, it could not be constructed as an object of cognition, that is, as a part by which the ego can predicate its existence in-itself.

Each phenomenon, by an internal principle of construction, must be made subject to a concept which shall completely contain it; to the extent it is determined by the concept as subject, it is the condition for the construction of the concept, that is, it must contain the principle of enlarging the concept by the addition of another part, to which, as its own addition, it is causal, as it is the condition of the construction of the other. Without this internal construction, the cognition of phenomena as necessarily connected is impossible. The ego, by infinitating the image, must judge that phenomena have objective existence only as they are connected as cause and effect, for the ego, insofar as it is determined as an internal existence, must construct its cognitions synthetically by applying the principle of its internalization, the time-concept, to the images given in a perception. The images, being given conceptual construction, are made to exist by participation in the concept, and every image can be constructed as a concept by the internalizing principle of the ego.

When the ego constructs its object synthetically, by parts, it must be by an infinitation of the parts, for each part must be capable of being added to, and of remainining identical with the addition. But the part could remain identical in its addition only if it were a part without finite place, a free part in an infinite field, limited only by what is not constructed, or by the totality of identical parts which constitute the entire field. Thus in a synthetical construction, the object is limited only negatively by the necessary connection of its parts in the conceptual continuum.

An object is made distant only in its construction by parts. For if it were constructed as a unit, it would be related immediately to the ego, and would be completely limited. Phenomena are, then, in themselves, of merely subjective value, given by the concept in determining the ego as identical with itself through its image. To receive objective validity they must be placed at a distance, that is, made subject to an infinite number of predicates, in each of which they must be present as a part. But for a phenomenon to be enlarged it must change from one concept-sphere to another, and therefore must have communication between the two. Therefore the logical expression of the internal principle of construction is that the whole is determined by the parts since it is by the change of phenomena that the parts are constructed, that is, successively.

In a synthetic judgment the subject is not connected immediately with the predicate, but it must construct its predicate as its mediation, and therefore as a possible subject. A synthetic judgment, whose parts are necessarily connected in a hypothetical proposition, enounces only the relative, or local existence of the parts, in respect to a continuous field which connects them internally; their existence, as the principle of their necessary connection as cause and effect, is not the object of cognition, but of mediation, in the judgment. In a synthetical judgment, the subject is amplified by its predicates,

not through its limitation, but by its constructing a connection with another part. In order for the subject to be amplified through its predicates and connected necessarily, it must contain the principle of its own connection; that is, since parts, in themselves, have existence by virtue of the internal principle of the concept only, which is constructed as the totality of its parts, the subject of a judgment expressing the necessary relation between parts is causal. But the subject, through the internal principle, does not construct this connection by the addition of a finite part, for this addition would be from without, and as a part, would have no necessary connection with the subject, or would merely limit the subject, in case of simple enumeration, to its own phenomenal identity, so that the subject would not be causal in respect to its predicate. If the subject is to be amplified, it must be infinitated by its predicate, but it must possess identity with the predicate in order to be communicated in the concept.

If an object is finite, judgment in respect to its finite demonstration is made, and synthetical propositions are simple enumerations. If the object has an internal existence, it must be demonstrated analogically by a synthetic judgment, on the analogy of the singular judgment, whereby the subject is amplified in the direction of the infinite whole. This induction of the whole from the ampliation of parts must assume an internal principle which necessarily connects phenomena as the principle of their change. But phenomena can be constructed by an internal principle only if they are composed, in themselves, of non-finite parts, or they would be limited to simple identity. If the whole exists only in the ampliation of its parts, phenomena exist, in themselves, in their change only. Phenomena, to change, must have internal connection through permanent continuum, hence they must necessarily exist through their construction therein, for the concept itself, from which they derive existence, is a construct of the change, or negation of phenomena. For if there is a principle of in-

ternal identity which makes change possible, it is the concept region which must be constructed by parts. But as the concept is an analogical whole it does not exist as parts, but only in their construction. If the concept is not to be limited by its construction by parts, the parts must be free, so that each may become causal in relation to the totality of its predicates, for the subject of a synthetical proposition must contain, in itself, the principle of the construction of the whole concept, as the completed infinitation of the part as phenomenon. If phenomena exist only in relation to their change, they must be, in themselves, constructions of a substance-region existing by virtue of the change of phenomena. If the principle of their existence is internal, it can be expressed only by the form of the hypothetical proposition, as a principle connecting parts in a local construction, a degree, or moment of participation; for each construction of the concept, being an infinitation of a singular phenomenon, is an analogical singular act, wherein the object-in-itself is constructed by the addition of a negative unit. The principle of synthetical judgment is thus an analogical demonstration of making inference from particulars by virtue of the negative unity of phenomena with a universal, infinite, field. Ampliative induction is the necessary method, the "constituitive logic" of internalized cognition. For if the object exists, in itself, it is in one-to-one correspondence with all its parts, and the position of the parts is only negative; they exist, in themselves, in continuous identity, free, without place. But if the object exists, in-itself, it is but the totality of its parts. Therefore the parts are connected necessarily, and therein consists the very possibility of the analogical apodictical singular judgment, in which the finite image, by a series of negative constructions, is communicated to a free field.

III

ASCETIC RECREATION

The internalization of the object of perception in the construction of a concept is an act whereby the ego is made subject, as a phenomenon, to other phenomena, and as a thing-in-itself, to the free field of the infinite whole; thereby the ego is placed an infinite distance from its object, whose principle is hidden, and which can be known only through its effects. Therefore the condition of internal experience is the subjection of the ego by a principle which, because it cannot be known (for while it is the principle of conceptual construction, it limits the ego in each of its cognitions to knowledge of merely subjective value), though it act immediately upon the ego as the condition of its cognition, must be given to the ego as an imperative, an imperative being the analogical principle of reason which is the function of constructing images, or ideas. The problem of reason is therefore formal, and solved in the construction of the object itself; but for the ego as subject, the possibility of objective existence, in itself, is the problem which can be solved by a symbolical, or analogical construction only. Thus, internal experience is made possible by the subversion of the function of reason, whereby the ego, in all its acts, is made contingent upon a force operating upon it from a distance, which, as the (analogical) principle of reason, determines it as a subject in a community of subjects, and gives it, insofar as it is a communicant with the substance-class, a symbolic existence.

As an internal objective existence can be constructed only by the totality of its parts, the problem of existence must be shared by the community of subjects, and the ego is obliged to act for the sake of a class. For since existence, in itself, is a mediation between one part and another, and each part is determined by the internal principle, it becomes the duty of each subject to act vicariously for the entire class. Since the existence of each subject is contingent upon the construction of the entire class, and since each subject exercises the principle of this construction as a duty, each subject is compelled to act (as the condition of its existence) as if it could act vicariously for the entire class; for insofar as the subject has objective existence, insofar as it is obedient to the imperative analogical principle of reason, it is able to construct the class in a single act. Accordingly, the principle of the concept operates upon the ego as an analogical final cause, which in subjecting the ego, motivates it with the power of the entire class. Thus the ego is delegated power in proportion to its subjection, a power which it can exercise at a distance, in place of its own finite constructions.

Since the internal existence of the ego is contingent upon the construction of the entire concept, and since this construction is effected through the totality of its parts, the analogical principle of reason is revealed in a hypothetical imperative enjoining the ego to subject itself in order to participate in a universal free field which requires its submission as the condition for its complete construction. The ego is therefore obliged to construct its existence by an analogical singular act representing the construction of the entire concept, which act, however, constructs but a local existence, since it is of but a part of the community; but the community requires the participation of the subject ego for its construction, and from this necessity it enjoins a necessary subject-existence.

But the analogical principle of reason cannot be demon-

strated by a singular act, since its object requires a successive construction through parts by their internal identity; therefore it can be demonstrated as a cause only, since to demonstrate its effects would require the construction of the totality of the parts of its object. It can be demonstrated as the motive of the subject only, compelled to construct its object at a distance, that is, to cognize mediately by subjecting phenomena to a cause whose effect they merely mediate; therefore no act of the ego can be totally effective since it must act as but a member, and no cognition can comprehend the object, as it is in itself, for thereby the cause would be wholly communicated; but the ego yet, as subject, can be effective symbolically, that is, act as though it were completely communicated as pure subject, and cognize the object in itself symbolically through an analogical science of infinity.

If the ego, by an act, is to symbolically communicate its motive fully, it must, in itself, be fully subject, and possess substantial identity with it; if, as a part, it is identical with the whole, it must be infinite, and if it is to communicate this infinity, it must cognize phenomena as subject to the same principle, or as containing the cause whereby they can be communicated to an infinite field. As the cause, while immediately motivating the ego, is effective symbolically in the successive creation of a free field for it, it provides the ego with a principle whereby it can cognize phenomena symbolically as a mediation between the causal principle and its unity in the totality of its effects. The ego, as subject, is obliged to cognize its object as being constructed at an infinite distance from its cause, and the ego, as communicating the causal principle, must cognize by constructing a symbolic continuum through which the entire distance can be mediated, so that the cause may be present in each of its effects, subjecting each to the concept of the infinite whole. If the cause is to remain identical with each construction of the continuum, it must be composed of an infinite number of

simple parts, without duration or extension. For as it requires a free field of communication, it must be limited by none of its parts. Since each part communicates the cause, though separated from it by an infinite number of other parts, and is constructed by virtue of that communication, it exists only as it is causal to another effect in amplifying the free field, as a symbol of the totality of parts constructed as a whole. The cause, then, cannot be demonstrated, but is symbolized as the imperative of freedom.

The analogical principle of reason is therefore the motive of freedom for the ego which is subjected, by the same principle, to the cognition of phenomena, insofar as it is phenomenal-self. It provides the ego, insofar as it is subject, with the possibility of an ascetic recreation in the world-as-image, by its reconstructing the world as the subject-ego's free field, a world internally determined so that each subject is effective, through an infinite distance, in the fully realized result.

If the principle of freedom is the motive of reason, then reason is the faculty of communication and its objects are only symbolically true, for thereby reason could construct its object only negatively, as subject to pure causality and communicator of a negative limit; that is, reason could not construct its object except mediately, as it communicates the principle of causality. If freedom is the principle of reason, reason cannot demonstrate this principle except by becoming subject, and can never cognize an object as it exists in itself, but only as it is subject to causality, for the construction of a part is the condition of its communication, or negation, as a free part.

If pure causality is the motive of reason, reason is purely determined as subject and has no principle by which to demonstrate this principle, which is therefore either irrational or it limits the reason to the cognition of phenomena as negative limits, as constructions which, in themselves, communicate the principle of causality. If reason is motivated by

the thing in itself, it must cognize it as operating at a distance, and reason is the faculty of limiting cognition to the substantial connection of phenomena. Reason, accordingly, would be a negatively limiting function of cognition, motivated by the principle that reason is incapable of constructing its images, or ideas, that the whole act of causality must supervene between reason and its idea by the subjection of the totality of phenomenal limits to the negative unity of the thing-in-itself. Reason, as determined by the principle of freedom, is the faculty of demonstration by the principles of the concept, and gives a negative judgment on the value of the ideas, or images, of reason, demonstrated, for the purpose of persuasion, in a method analogical to the demonstration of ideas.

If the ego is motivated by its image, or idea, it has no principle with which to contradict their demonstration. But if it is motivated by pure causality, it is fully determined as a phenomenon; as pure subject, it fully communicates the principle by which phenomena can be changed, or given direction toward a free field, where it is only negatively determined. If the ego is subject to phenomena, it does not construct, but merely reconstructs, the objects given it, and the reason is ambiguously determined in respect to its image. Thus undetermined by an object, the reason is free, in contradistinction to the phenomenal self. The subject-ego therefore has a dual existence, as self, and as in-self, and thereby reason is given the possibility of recreating the self as a nonfinite, internalized existence, subject only to ambiguously determining time.

A judgment is the anticipation of the construction of an object, an exercise of taste. If the reason is to be determined as free, it is required to pass a negative judgment upon the images of perception, that is, it must be obliged to renounce its finite objects. But since reason is the faculty of demonstration, it must be given a demonstration that this renunciation

of its objects is an object in itself. It must be persuaded that its object is constructed only negatively; by submitting to the negative judgment of the ego, the reason may develop a taste for freedom. If the reason is to be free, it must be persuaded that it is incapable of constructing its ideas as finite wholes, that they require infinity for their construction. The persuasion of reason is to be thus effected through the substitution of analogical ideas for its finite images, and an ascetic discipline for finite construction.

If finite constructions are not the objects of reason, then reason's ideas are simpler than they seem. For a finite construction, being singular, completely placed, and unchangeable, cannot be communicated, cannot occupy another place, and as singular, it belongs only to its creator. But if reason is persuaded that the finite object is not the complete construction of the idea, all finite objects will seem to be phenomena, or partial constructions of a whole object, and therefore simpler than the whole, but only if they are parts of a finite whole.

If the whole is not finite it is not limited by a finite part, but its parts must be simpler than finity. If the ideas of reason are not finite, they must be constructed by the addition of simple parts. So constructed, the ideas must be able to be contained in all the parts as identical with them, and move freely through them in the construction of a subsequent part. The ideas, therefore, if they are constructed of infinity, must be simpler than finite constructions.

Reason is thus presented with the analogical idea that its object, in itself, is composed of simple substance, and that only therefore is the object unchanging, that is, in itself, as it is ambiguously determined in respect to its position. But as reason cannot cognize a simple part, the analogical idea of substance is effective only in enforcing a negative judgment on reason's creative function.

Persuaded that its object is simpler, in itself, than the image

given to it in perception, that it exists in internal communication with other objects, reason is obliged to consider its images as symbols of a continuously effective causality, and it becomes its duty to treat of them as functions of motion, that is, to recreate phenomena as if they were free, as if they had no finite place. By means of symbols the images can be reconstructed as a typology of internal existence, as abstractions of place. Through one symbol two objects may have abstract community and become simpler than they were as two. By each addition of an abstracted image the symbol is amplified and the images given fuller communion. The symbol is contained in each addition as its cause and it is by virtue of this abstract communication that an addition of a part can be made. But the symbol requires for its full signification, and, for its true representation of the thing-in-itself, its full communication, that is, the complete enumeration of all its parts. But as a symbol is the abstraction of an object, it is ambiguously determined in respect to place and requires an addition of infinite parts whose sum shall be unity. Thus the unity which the reason constructs in a finite object is abstracted and reconstructed as a symbol of simple substance. But the addition of unity to infinity is a negative addition, made on the analogy of the formal unity required of reason from its ideas, as is the addition of symbol to substance, serving only to communicate, or negate, the ideas of reason. The symbolic unity of an infinite class of objects is but an analogical construction of the unity of the image. The induction of a universal class of objects from particulars is their simplification, through infinity, into identical substances. Without the analogical idea of simple substance, the inductive method of logic (internal taxonomy) would be impossible. For if the class is amplified by the parts, that is, fully signified, it must be present in them as simple continuity, operating on them as the cause of their particular identity. Since the class is constructed from parts, and limited only

negatively, by simple identity of the parts, it must be constructed of infinite parts; but the sum of the parts is the simple abstract unity by which an image is communicated, its analogical construction as a symbol. If the ideas of reason are composed of simple substance, it is the duty of reason, as motivated by pure causality, to reconstruct its images as fully signified symbols.

Reason, from the analogy of finite unity of its image, requires unity in its object-*class*. Because reason requires that the unity of place, which was abstracted from its image in its communication, be replaced, it requires, if it is to cognize by the principle of the concept, the use of synthetical proposition. For if reason is persuaded to construct its ideas symbolically of their existence, in themselves, as simple parts, it nevertheless requires, in the construction of each part, the addition of what the part, as such, does not contain, the unity of the whole object. Each construction must be made by the addition of unity as a negative limit, as the analogical principle of their necessary connection. Therefore, if reason constructs its ideas as symbols of an internal existence, as separate from finite objects, synthetical propositions will be the necessary form of cognition. For as the whole concept is constructed of parts it is conditioned by them, and as each part is the addition of unity to a part, each is conditioned by a prior construction. But as each addition communicates the unity of the concept, each part is free, containing all its conditions, in its construction, so that the concept, while determining phenomena as necessarily connected in succession, at the same time communicates them as free, by virtue of their necessary connection. By virtue of internal identity, each phenomenon is conditioned by another as an analogical part, a construction of space; but by virtue of the same identity each is free in communicating the abstract form of the concept. The concept is conditioned by its parts, but insofar as they communicate the pure causal principle, and thereby

the totality of conditions, they construct the concept as free.

If reason is motivated by the analogical idea of freedom, its form of cognition is given it as a conditional judgment, as symbol of its own subjection to causality. Obliged to cognize phenomena as communicators of pure causality, reason must necessarily cognize them as subject to change, as capable of being moved, for the aim of causality is their complete motivation in the totality of their changes, in each change communicating to the phenomena the principle of its concept, the unity of abstract form, as the result of its internal force. But inasmuch as it is conditioned, each form must change, as the condition for another form. Hence all phenomena are but the appearance of the transition from one form to another, in which subsequent form is contained a prior, as its condition of freedom. This progressive development towards simplicity of form, requiring at each step a regress over all the given conditions, is a necessary consequence of the conceptual principle of the ambiguous interval; and reason, motivated by the same principle, is obliged to cognize phenomena as *if* it communicated to them the principle of causality, that is, it must symbolize them as being only relatively placed. Since it must cognize by the symbol of their necessary connection, it must cognize as from a distance, through their succession. Since they are necessarily connected by the principle of the concept, they are ambiguously determined, free spaces, through this connection. Therefore nothing can be apodictically affirmed of phenomena but the principle of their connection, for since they are, in themselves, free, communicating the principle of causality, the law of the excluded middle will not apply to them.

Accordingly, the images given in perception, as finite, must not be the objects, but the conditions of cognition, imposed by a transcendent principle of causality as its own condition. The images will seem to be the appearances of an internal will,

or force, cognizable only symbolically as abstracted forms, and perception will give nothing of the object but an anticipation of a negative judgment on the possibility of cognizing the object, since they are all that is given to reason, and reason is therefrom unable to construct its ideas, except symbolically. A mistrust of the images given in perception is a mistrust of the use of reason. If the images of perception are not the objects of reason, they must be merely conventional aesthetic forms, the matter of sensation symbolized by the principle of the concept, and cognition is limited to making abstractions of its images, in regard to their identity and difference. Since phenomena are continuously freed through their change, any form attributed to them is only symbolic. If reason could cognize its analogical idea, it would construct, by the principle of concepts, the complete abstract of form, but constrained by the matter of sensation, it is limited to freeing form from sensation by its alteration, wherein each addition of the concept frees a part, that is, changes it, into a negative symbol of subjection to causality. Consequently reason must develop only a negative taste for its images, and train itself as a faculty of disinterested perception. As the agent of a cause affecting it from an infinite distance, it is prohibited from taking an interest in its immediate images, but must consider them as developments from conditions and anticipations of change, therefore, historically, as past and future. That is, the reason is motivated, as a prey, to escape its conditions, and its aim is given it as a universal negative action affecting the totality of its conditions, its duty is given to perceive phenomena as if their visibility were caused by an inwardly abstracting light, it is obliged to an ascetic discipline of cognition wherein it constructs the image of less than is given of it in perception. Trained to regard phenomena with disinterest, reason will direct its attention to their uniformity as manifesting their necessary connection; and as the condition of their connection is complicated, the problem of their

existence is simplified, that is, phenomena change in the direction of simplicity, towards the comprehension of their conditions by the principle of the concept. By a strenuous discipline of negation reason is trained to perceive its images as if they were abstract forms, as if it was not conditioned by its images, but was instead affecting them, from a distance comprising the totality of their construction as a series, with the principle of pure causality, impersonally. Thereby the images are removed and fixed at a distance, and the reason, to this extent, is free, as a communicator of causal principle, to passively contemplate "objective" form, that is, to cognize disinterestedly. For form, abstracted from its image for the free communication of reason, rouses no selfish interest.

For what is given for free communication, given as it is in itself, cannot be cognized except as a symbol, and as cognition is throughout a demonstration of an original judgment on the self, therefore a moral act, the ego which judges the self in the affirmative will cognize as an act of possession of its object. It will construct it as finite, and therefore not communicate it but perfect it. When the object is finished, the ego disposes of it as a name or an image, for it is then impersonal, "objective" knowledge, and the ego has no more interest in it. It wills to perfect the self as it is given by its image, finite, and therefore is more simply "conditioned"; but therefore its problem of "existence" is complicated by its exercise of power and pursuit of form, in the interval of time given for its ripening and fulfillment as a finite aim.

IV

SYNTHETIC MORALITY

THE ANALOGICAL IDEA of self, as unchanging, finite, existence, is substance, existence as an ambiguously determined whole containing all its conditions, that is, all selves as a transcendent community. But since this community is constructed internally by the successive addition of its members, it obligates each of its members to its communication, and through this obligation each member is rendered free and partakes of the existence of the whole community. Thus the analogical idea that each self is but a part of the common, free, self, imposes a synthetic, community, morality; a moral aim of free being to be constructed as a succession of acts as the pure exercise of the principle of the concept which enjoins the necessary connection of the ego with the free community. Conversely, the ego is obligated to participate, as the condition of the community, and as the condition of its own complete existence. For otherwise the ego is completely determined as self-phenomenon and is infinitely removed from the principle of its analogical idea. But even though the ego is determined as phenomenon, it is provided with a principle whereby it can act as if the act contained all its conditions, that is, as if it contained the totality of its effects, for the principle which imposes upon the ego its community-membership is the community's complete communication by each ego as each ego accepts its obligation to act as if it were selfless, or directly, ambiguously, determined by the principle of the concept.

Existence as substance is the analogical idea of perfected finite form, the idea of unchanging being determined by the whole conceptual principle of time; hence, the idea of an immortal community of free subjects, each of whom communicates universal being. In the same manner as the principle of the concept obliges inferences from particular judgments to universals, it enjoins the participation of all subject-egos for the construction of the substantial universal field; and, as in a conceptual construction, each particular communicates the universal by its being abstracted from its finite position and made constituitive of a field which shall contain it, and more; and by its communication through the particular, permit the particular to contain more than itself, and thereby move freely as a continuum of form (for since the concept is a negative construction, each particular, in communicating the negative principle, releases, or moves the image from its finite position, thus enlarging the concept in the direction of its whole infinite position), so each ego is obliged, to realize its complete existence, its immortality, to submit to the causal principle, that is, be moved into a region which shall contain more than the self. The ego must thus construct its universal existence, but analogically, by a complete negative act. For only thereby can it be unconditioned, or limit every condition to simple identity with it. But to the ego, as merely a particular ego, this act whereby it obtains free existence must be communicated. The construction of substance as free universal existence therefore requires the ego as a cause, that is, it must be constructed locally.

Accordingly, insofar as the ego is causal it is free, but since, as a phenomenon-self, it is determined, as the condition of its freedom, it is obliged to construct its universal existence symbolically, to act as if it were purely causal, and selfless; for it is only by the motive principle, and not by the effects, that the substantial community is constructed. Thus the analogical final cause is constructed as motive, as movement towards

simplicity, wherein freedom or pure movement is obtained through the identity of parts, though no construction can realize the idea, since it must be constructed as a series. Therefore the effects of any action must possess merely symbolic value, since the effects are conditioned, and no result can contain its cause, but merely transmit it; for the cause, being a negative principle, is greater than any of its effects, being contained in each of them as their principle of continuity with a free field; that is, it negates each of its effects. It is by virtue of this negative power that the ego, though effective locally only as a cause, nevertheless communicates the entire principle of the concept as substance, for the ego as cause is greater than any of its conditions, and thereby obtains universal existence, though its aim is only symbolically achieved, for the reason that its cause is only analogically formal.

Therefore, persuaded that its idea is freedom, the aim given to reason is communication of this idea as an analogical construction through a community which shall be symbolically effective of the idea, though through this construction its aim is given as conditional: the perfectibility of the community through time, the principle of all analogical ideas.

Since the demonstration of an analogical idea is a demonstration through concepts, the demonstration of a community of free substance requires the concept mankind as the totality of subjects successively perfecting itself. As in each act the conditions are increased in the direction of the completion, each act being made possible by the totality of prior conditions, each act attributable to mankind necessarily perfects the idea, and therefore, the idea requires the participation of each subject. But this community-participation obliges a revolution on the part of each ego, wherein it becomes internalized, become selfless, and the self becomes the prey of the class. The internalization enforces upon the ego a new system of symbolical perception, cognition, reason; an instinct for delegated power, an instinct for entering into the exist-

ence of another ego, of sympathy as a mode of cognition, of deferral of judgment until the totality of conditions shall have been given.

For as the analogical ideas are demonstrated by their communication through the classes effecting the proliferation of phenomenal forms as their symbols, it must be inferred that the condition of intelligibility is the communication of ideas, and that a cognition is true in proportion to the precise signification of its symbol, that is, to the extent to which it includes its conditions, its history; to the extent to which it can be made common property, impersonal knowledge, and to the extent to which it is a possession of the common self.

The image, in being replaced by a symbol, becomes free and communicable, containing all the conditions of the image, and thereby the image is internalized for perception. Its cognition will be inquiry into the conditions of its construction as a symbol, whereby cognition becomes a problem of semasiology. Inquiry into the conditions of the construction of mankind, the common self, is directed toward the full signification of the class-symbol, as *if* the class would be communicated free by this cognition, as *if* this cognition were obligated by a principle of reason, as *if* this common self-consciousness were the pure construction of the substantial community.

For all the conditions of the common self determine the members of the commonalty, and the sum of the conditions must be transmitted by the members for their perfectibility, for their simple community, which is advanced by the addition of conditions. That is, the class is reduced to uniformity in proportion to the degree that all of the members share the totality of its conditions, until it becomes able to effect a single act with the instinctive aptitude of subjects for whom the complete conditions of life have been created.

Therefore it becomes the duty of each member to be communicated by the totality of his conditions which comprise

his history as his common self, as the possibility of free development. This transmission is necessitated by the internal connection of all the members with the common self, which, as determined by the principle of the concept, must seek the totality of its conditions as given in the past. For the condition of any cognition by the concept is that the object shall be past, or put at a distance from its cause. By virtue of its internal identity with the common self, each member is required to make a regress over the entire conditions of the class in the direction of its origins in time, as the only method for amplifying the common self-consciousness; that is, each member is obliged to cognize for the class, as *if*, through its cognition, it was causal to all the conditions of the class. By this regress, the historical inquiry, whereby the common self is amplified, the ego cognizes as *if* it were creating its self as free, that is, it cognizes its self as a universal symbolic existence through its communication of all the conditions of its class. Therefore it is cognition by sympathy, an entering into another's cognition, cognition as a symbol of a faculty of universal cognition, and in being thus freely in communication with the common consciousness, the ego is never alone; existing in a line of continuity with its class, it experiences vicariously all the conditions of the class. Thereby its problem of cognition is simplified into the problem of finding the most appropriate symbols of reference, and the most uniform method of communication, requiring an inquiry into symbols as the development of common consciousness, an inquiry which is perfectible as the complete communication of class-consciousness. Accordingly, truth is not the correspondence of a cognition with its object, but with its symbol.

As the class is perfectible by being communicated through the totality of its conditions, whereby alone it is able to change, or progress in the direction of internal simplicity, the condition of its perfection is its future development; but its perfection is contingent upon its communication of its past;

it requires the freedom of all its members, that is, the comprehension of all the conditions of their development. Historical inquiry is, then, a symbolic construction of the self-class, conditioned for its perfection in the future; it is the vicarious self-fulfillment by all the members of the *class*-man, a vicarious exercise of power at an infinite distance, through an abstract, impersonal, self; based on irrational persuasion that the ideas of reason must be constructed as infinite wholes.

CONCLUSION

THE CLASS-BIAS resulting from the communal attempt to attain freedom tends towards the depersonalization of knowledge, and towards the debasement of philosophy to generalized systems of verbal techniques.

For, when the objects of knowledge are considered as given, and given as fully conditioned, the problem of knowing is reduced to finding the full communication of each term of a proposition by a regress over all its conditions in the direction of the free, the unconditioned, in other words, the pure mediating term. In this scheme, the terms of a proposition are considered fully communicated if all their conditions are fully signified, and every term can be considered perfectly communicable through a signalization of the conditions under which it is used. Knowledge is thereby reduced to systems of prediction and verification, with the required signs and sign tenders forming a class of subjects-to-knowledge mediated by language, by whom, consequently, words will be treated in respect to their conceptual value. For, to investigate the conditions under which a word may be validly used, the word must be regarded as being controlled by its conditions. As a communal-covenant, the word will be the instrument which adds meaning to phenomena. It will be knowledge itself of phenomena, since it will affix to the phenomena their classes. The word, through its being conditioned by the concept and by adding its class to the phenomenon, will therefore condition it by the entire series of the class.

The technique of knowing will therefore involve developing a suitable communal vocabulary. As the object becomes the controlling of the conditions of knowing, the problem becomes one of finding a constant series of conditions, an absolute "conditioner," and a language (since the truth of a proposition must depend on the full communication of its terms), which will be a perfectly uniform transmitter. Since the knower must conceive his object as conditioned, he must find out all which its terms signify, and therefore he knows it not immediately, but through the communications of other signalers. For his object is properly the object of the entire class. His aim is not theory, but an addition to the accumulated body of working knowledge which is the property of the class. The constant progress in uniform communication will presumably perfect "knowledge," as phenomena freed, signified, made exchangeable.

The act of mediation is a progress in which knowledge is obtained through the word. The principle of this knowledge is demonstrated in the time-symbol, the absolute measure, the perfect signal, uniform and unanalysable, to which all terms are ultimately referred for their appraisal. This mystical transmission by which knowledge is "given," is the metaphysic of impersonal knowledge, the logos as the fixed sign.

An object of knowledge so "given" makes the object of knowledge common. Internalization of the object has its expression in a logic of classes. A class cannot properly contain other than abstractions, organized in the direction of simplicity in the class-object, with the terms connected on a basis of equality.

But in respect to the type of object for which a term is created, meaning is obtained by a logical superimposition, in which the members are constructed in the direction of the complexity of the type-form, for the members approximate to their type, but are merely included by their class.

If words are "given" as fully conditioned by the principle of their concept, there can be no question of a "theory" of knowledge, but of a perfection of the technique of communication. The problem of knowledge is simplified as the "conditions" of knowledge are complicated. Thinking is simplified by the communal effort to depersonalize the type. The issue is not only the survival of knowledge a theory of ideas, but the survival of the person, as a person. For the person is cut off from Self by the dogma that knowledge is good "in-itself," in the impersonalized concept of the communal object, that it is perfectible as technique, that only this impersonal knowledge can have truth, and that knowledge belongs not to the person but to the class.

But a person can know only the images belonging to Self, the incommunicable, the inspiriting and form-giving, which he knows as purpose and ultimate cause. However, if the person is conditioned and his knowledge "given" by the class, there is no question of his creating ideas.

Controlled conditions entail a system of class-imperatives; the signalers must be conditioned also. The person is given the imperative "know, as if the totality of knowledge were given by the act of the unconditioned, the mediating word, connecting sensor with sensa data, sense data with phenomena, phenomena with the class, class with the principle of the concept, time." The most compelling argument from class is that knowledge does not belong to Self, and that personal moral judgments do not touch the problem of knowledge.

If a term is conditioned it requires communicators handing over from one to another the signals obtained. The truth of one can be verified only by another signal obtained. Consequently the problem of truth is stated in terms of prediction and verification by control of conditions. Truth, therefore, must be entirely communicable, for repetition in time, the abstract of the repetition of unity in the interval, and the

principle of all concepts, is the indespensable condition of all "conditions."

Every philosophy is a construction of the image of the person in terms of ultimate purpose. History, as metaphysic, has replaced the language of philosophy with the terminology of class logic, and has made the question of the very possibility of a philosophy of ideas the major problem of philosophy.

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